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ZONING NEW YORK CITY TO PROVIDE LOW
AND MODERATE INCOME HOUSING-CAN
COMMERCIAL DEVELOPERS BE MADE TO
HELP?
I. Introduction
Lower income New York City residents are faced with a housing
emergency.' Concurrently, commercial and luxury residential devel-
opment is expanding.2 New York is considering adopting an approach
to the housing shortage which has been taken in several other cities.3
The plan advocates amendment of the City's4 zoning ordinance to
require developers of commercial and luxury residential projects to
provide the City with lower income housing units.5
1. In authorizing enactments to control housing rental rates, the State legisla-
ture found a "serious public emergency' in housing across the State. See N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8622 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). The authorized enactments
must be premised upon a finding of a local housing emergency, which can exist only
if the vacancy rate is less than 5%, Id. § 8623(a). Once an "emergency" is declared it
continues until a contrary finding is made by the local legislative body. Id. § 8623(b).
Pursuant to this authority, New York City in 1979 reaffirmed the existence of a
"serious public emergency" in City housing. Id. following § 8617 (NEW YORK, N.Y.,
RENT STABILIZATION LAW §§ YY51-1.0, 1.0.1).
New York City's vacancy rate is estimated to be below 2.5%. See, e.g., Sullivan,
Testimony to the Mayor's Development Commitment Study Commission, Board of
Estimate Chambers 1, 6 (Sept. 22, 1983). The actual percentage, however, merely is
symbolic of a situation that has become a fact of life in New York City. See Baker,
Moscow on the Hudson, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1983, at A27, col. 5 (satirizing the
lengths to which New York City residents must go to find any apartment, much less
an affordable one).
2. In 1979, 110,000 square feet of office space were added to Manhattan.
During the next three vears 412,000, 558,000 and 8,486,000 square feet were added.
The projection is that there will be an additional 10,430,000 square feet during 1983.
Sullivan, Testimony to Mayor's Development Commitment Study Commission 6
(Sept. 22, 1983) (citing data of Real Estate Board of New York). Mr. Sullivan's
comments, as well as other testimony given before the Commission, are available
from the Pratt Institute Center for Community and Environmental Development,
379 DeKalb Ave., 2d Floor, Steuben Hall, Brooklyn, New York 11205.
3. See infra notes 23, 35 and accompanying text for a discussion of other cities'
adoption of land use methods to address their needs for lower income housing.
4. In this Note "City" refers to New York City exclusively; "city" refers to cities
generally. Several of the cases cited deal with towns or villages within New York
State. See infra note 70 for a discussion of the applicability of these cases to zoning
actions taken by cities.
5. Inclusionary Zoning and Housing Trust Fund: A Proposal for Equitable
Development in New York City 9-11 (Draft, Dec. 12, 1983)[hereinafter cited as
Draft Proposal]. The proposal is the result of a joint effort by the Pratt Institute
Center for Community and Environmental Development and thie Center for Metro-
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New York City receives its authority to enact zoning ordinances by
direct grant from the New York State legislature.6 The grant is a
delegation of the state's police power,7 which authorizes the City to
enact ordinances for the safety, health or general welfare of its citi-
zens." Although the power of the enabling act is construed broadly,9 it
is not equivalent to the State's full police power.' 0 Pursuant to this
grant, New York City may regulate the uses of land, the size of
structures and lots and the population density." Enactments which
politan Action at Queens College of the City University of New York. It may be
acquired by writing directly to the Center at Queens College, Flushing, New York
11367.
6. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 370, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138,
145, 285 N.E.2d 291, 296-97, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972)(exercise of
zoning power to create timed population growth scheme must be founded upon
legislative delegation, though it need not be specifically authorized)[hereinafter cited
as Golden v. Ramapo].
7. See McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 111 Misc. 2d 1046, 1057, 445 N.Y.S.2d
859, 867 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981)(police power resides within state and is
delegated by state to its towns for zoning purposes).
8. Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 484-85, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, 389, 330
N.E.2d 403, 405-06, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975)(town's establishment of
"Retirement Community District" for aged persons promoted community's health
and general welfare by meeting town's need for housing the aged).
9. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1973)(police power supported
limitation of one-family residences to occupancy by no more than two unrelated
persons to provide for "quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor
vehicles restricted").
10. Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Upper Brookville, 51
N.Y.2d 338, 342-43, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182, 414 N.E.2d 680, 682, cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1042 (1980)(delegation of authority not coterminous with stated police power
objectives; establishment of zones in which lots must be at least five acres permissible
as within enumerated purposes of enabling act)(quoting Golden v. Ramapo, 30
N.Y.2d at 370, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 145, 285 N.E.2d at 296-97).
11. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20 subds. 24, 25 (McKinney 1968 & Supp.
1983-1984). This act provides in part that:
Subject to the constitution and general laws of this state, every city is
empowered:
24. To regulate and limit the height, bulk and location of buildings
hereafter erected, to regulate and determine the area of yards, courts and
other open spaces, and to regulate the density of population in any given
area, and for said purposes to divide the city into districts. Such regula-
tions shall be uniform for each class of buildings throughout any district,
but the regulations in one or more districts may differ from those in other
districts. Such regulations shall be designed to secure safety from fire,
flood and other dangers and to promote the public health and welfare,
including, so far as conditions may permit, provision for adequate light,
air, convenience of access, and the accommodation of solar energy systems
and equipment and access to sunlight necessary therefor, and shall be
made with reasonable regard to the character of buildings erected in each
district, the value of land and the use to which it may be put, to the end
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exceed the statutory grant are ultra vires and void.' 2 Thus, the City
may not use its zoning power to correct a general problem which is
unrelated to the use of the zoned land.' 3 Even enactments which are
within the grant may be invalid if they bear no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.' 4
Land use regulations in the United States have a relatively short
history. 15 A city normally is divided into districts and regulations are
established for each district. 16 This traditional approach to zoning
that such regulations may promote public health, safety and welfare and
the most desirable use for which the land of each district may be adapted
and may tend to conserve the value of buildings and enhance the value of
land throughout the city.
25. To regulate and restrict the location of trades and industries and the
location of buildings, designed for specified uses, and for said purposes to
divide the city into districts and to prescribe for each such district the
trades and industries that shall be excluded or subjected to special regula-
tion and the uses for which buildings may not be erected or altered. Such
regulations shall be designed to promote the public health, safety and
general welfare and shall be made with reasonable consideration, among
other things, to the character of the district, its peculiar suitability for
particular uses, the conservation of property values and the direction of
building development, in accord with a well considered plan.
12. Golden v. Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 369-70, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144-45, 285
N.E.2d at 296-97 (ordinance is ultra vires unless power to condition future develop-
ment upon showing of presence of sufficient support facilities can be implied from
statutory scheme of enabling legislation).
13. Id. at 371 n.5, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 146 n.5, 285 N.E.2d at 297 n.5 (end sought
must be peculiar to locality's basic land use scheme). See also Westwood Forest
Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 427, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129, 132,
244 N.E.2d 700, 702 (1969)(impermissible to bar new development on grounds that
it would strain existing sewage disposal facilities where inadequacy existed prior to
developer's application and was not caused by nature of development).
14. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391 (1926)(zoning
restrictions on land use excluding business from residential areas bore substantial
relationship to health, safety and general welfare). See also Berenson v. Town of
New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 109-10, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 680-81, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242
(1975)(total ban on new multiple residences impermissible unless properly balanced
plan exists to meet needs of town and of region for such housing, thus establishing
substantial relation to health, safety and general welfare).
15. The nation's first comprehensive zoning ordinance was enacted by New York
City in 1916. Elliott and Marcus, From Euclid to Ramapo: New Directions in Land
Development Controls, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 56, 58 (1973)[hereinafter cited as Euclid
to Ramapo]. The origins of zoning as a means of land use control can be traced
through its relationship with the common law of nuisance. Comment, Zoning and
the Law of Nuisance, 29 FORe)HAM L. REv. 749 (1961).
16. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW, § 20 subds. 24, 25 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1983-
1984). For an example of districting, see the description by Justice Sutherland of the
relatively simple ordinance under challenge in Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. at 379-84.
The complexity of districting may be appreciated best by viewing the maps incorpo-
rated in a current city ordinance. See, e.g., New York City Zoning Resolution (1961),
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does not afford the flexibility which a city needs to plan adequately
for future growth and development.17 In response, cities have enacted
more flexible zoning mechanisms.' 8 These mechanisms change the
subject of control from a single parcel to tracts of land 9 or to non-
contiguous designated parcels20 within a district. They also represent a
zoning maps 8c, 8d (as amended July 21, 1983) (issued by N.Y.C. Dep't of City
Planning). The maps depict the applicability of the Residential (RI to RIO), Manu-
facturing (MI-1 to M3-2) and Commercial (Cl-i to C8-4) Use District regulations to
the Midtown section of Manhattan. Id. Superimposed upon these general districts are
regulations established for Special Purpose Districts such as the Special Clinton
District. Id. art. IX, chap. 6 (as amended April 29, 1982).
17. Traditional zoning is referred to as "Euclidean" zoning. This reference has
been said to refer to Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, the Supreme Court's first
pronouncement on the question of zoning. 82 AM. Jun. 20 Zoning & Planning § 1
(1976). However, the term also is suggestive of Euclidean geometry and thus of the
rigidly patterned thought which has impeded cities in planning for future growth.
Zoning ordinances must be enacted in accordance with a comprehensive plan. See,
e.g., N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20, subd. 25 (McKinney 1968)(regulations to be "in
accord with a well considered plan"). One pair of commentators has charged that the
inability of traditional, Euclidean zoning to react to the actual operation of a city has
"helped turn the concentration of activities that is essential to the success of a city into
congestion." Euclid to Ramapo, supra note 15, at 56. Another pair of commentators,
having stated the requirements of effective urban land use planning, state that for
purposes of implementing plans, the "vision of [Euclidean zoning] approximates the
technological insight of the inventor of the cookie cutter." Freilich and Quinn,
Effectiveness of Flexible and Conditional Zoning Techniques-What They Can and
What They Can Not Do For Our Cities, 1979 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT
DOMAIN 167, 168 [hereinafter cited as Conditional Zoning]. See also Golden v.
Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 372, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 147, 285 N.E.2d at 298 (focus on
individual sites ineffective in treating problems of larger development).
18. See Holmes v. Planning Bd., 78 A.D.2d 1, 14, 433 N.Y.S.2d 587, 596 (2d
Dep't 1980) (increasing desire of cities to plan growth has led to greater acceptance of
more flexible devices proposed by professional planners). The intent is to encourage
desired development and to induce the developers to provide various public ameni-
ties. See Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Zoning in THE
NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES,
23 (Marcus & Groves eds. 1970); Euclid to Ramapo, supra note 15, at 56-57.
19. Rather than setting a uniform size for all units in the district, "cluster" zoning
considers the desirable total development of an area and distributes that amount of
development throughout the area. Niccolai v. Planning Bd., 148 N.J. Super. 150,
152, 372 A.2d 352, 353 (A.D. 1977). "Planned Unit Development" permits a mixture
of uses on a tract and varies size restrictions in consideration of the benefit to be
gained from the whole tract. Rudderow v. Township Comm. of Mt. Laurel, 121 N.J.
Super. 409, 413, 297 A.2d 583, 585 (1972) (discussing Municipal Planned Unit Devel-
opment Act (1967)), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-54 to 55-67 (West 1967)). See generally
Symposium: Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 3 (1965).
20. Development Rights Transfers sever the air rights from a parcel and allow
them to be added to the development potential of one of several nearby designated
sites. See Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of
Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972); Note, New York City Zoning
Resolution Section 12-10: A Third Phase in the Evolution of Airspace Law, 11
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shift in goals from passively restricting nuisances to actively garnering
benefits from developers in furtherance of a city's plan for future
growth.2 ' Acquiring additional housing for lower income individuals22
is one such benefit which cities would like to gain from private capital
rather than at public expense. 23
This Note examines the proposed requirement that commercial
developers provide lower income housing units. It addresses the ques-
tion of the validity of such a requirement in the context of New York
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1039 (1983). Such a plan was upheld over a constitutional
challenge in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 397
N.Y.S.2d 914, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104, reh'g denied, 439 U.S.
883 (1978)(city prohibited plaintiff's development above Grand Central Terminal
but allowed rights to be transferred within area).
21. Incentive zoning plans encourage desirable uses or induce the addition of
beneficial features to new construction by allowing the developer to increase the
project to a higher level of density in exchange for inclusion of the desired use or
feature. 1 R. ANDERSON, NEW YORK ZONING AND PRACTICE § 8.16, at 347 (1983). See
generally Mandelker, The Basic Philosophy of Zoning: Incentive or Restraint? in THE
NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ECONOMIC CONCEPrS AND TECHNIQUES
(Marcus & Groves eds. 1970). In New York, the arrival of incentive zoning was
widely heralded. Huxtable, Thinking Man's Zoning, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1971, § D,
at 22, col. 1. More recently, it has been decried as "Frankenstein zoning." Costonis,
Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of the Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L.
REV. 355, 363 (1982)(quoting Huxtable, New York's Zoning Law is Out of Bounds,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1980, § 2, at 41, col. 1). Professor Costonis contends that
incentive zoning "has sanctioned ... bulky, light- and air-blocking slabs . . . . It has
transformed reasonably predictable and impartial zoning procedures into a bazaar
...."" Id. The City also has experienced difficulties in actually acquiring the benefits
for which these bonus rights were awarded. Gottlieb, City Is Shorted in Some
Development Deals, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1983, § 4, at 6E, col. 2.
22. In its references to lower income individuals, this Note includes those of both
moderate and low incomes. A "moderate income" is no greater than 80% and no less
than 50% of the median income of the area. A "low income" does not exceed 50% of
the median income of the area. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981) (defining
income standards for Section 8 housing subsidy program; program uses terms "lower
income" and "very low income" respectively).
Housing which is affordable by lower income individuals costs no more than 30%
of the person's income. See id. § 1437a(b)(1) (setting rent to be charged for federally
subsidized lower income housing); 12 U.S.C. § 1701s(d) (1982)(setting amounts
payable as rent supplements for lower income housing). This federal standard is
slightly higher than the commonly accepted figure of 25% of income. See South
Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 221 n.8, 456
A.2d 390, 421 n.8 (1983)[hereinafter cited as Mt. Laurel II].
23. See Fulton, Boom Cities Force Office Developers to Build Housing, Los
Angeles Daily Journal, Aug. 5, 1982, at 1, col. 6 (reporting litigation challenging
Santa Monica, California's zoning ordinance, which requires developers to include
lower income housing units). See also Marcus, Zoning Exactions Employed to Solve
Housing Problems, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5, 1983, at 1, col. 3 (trend in attempts to gain
housing units as benefit from developers criticized as contrary to essential nature of
zoning, which is merely to regulate land use and to av.oid any negative effects).
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City's statutory authority to use zoning ordinances to place conditions
upon proposed development projects. By analogy to the limitations on
this authority, this Note recommends a shift in emphasis to bring such
a program into compliance with New York law.
II. The Requirements Of Zoning Ordinances With Respect to
Lower Income Housing
A. Invalid Exclusionary Ordinances
A prime goal of zoning is assuring sufficient housing to meet current
needs. 24 A zoning ordinance also should anticipate future housing
needs. 25 A municipality must consider these needs not only within its
own borders, but also within the general region. 21
The ordinance must contemplate appropriate housing for all seg-
ments of the population.2 7 A municipality may not use zoning to
24. South Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 184-85, 336 A.2d 713, 730 (1975)(challenged ordinances precluded lower in-
come housing; court directed that impediments be removed from ordinances) [he-
reinafter cited as Mt. Laurel I]; Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 260-61, 456 A.2d at 442-43
(since only minimal efforts had been made to alleviate problem of shortage of lower
income housing, affirmative measures had to be undertaken to assure actual con-
struction).
25. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 378, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138,
152, 285 N.E.2d 291, 301 (1972)("[z]oning is a means by which a governmental body
can plan for the future-it may not be used as a means to deny the future").
26. A city's authority to regulate land use ends at its boundaries. See Siegel v.
Tange, 61 A.D.2d 57, 401 N.Y.S.2d 269 (2d Dep't 1978)(where subject lots were
located partially in adjoining township which was not party to action, proceeding to
direct granting of variances had to be dismissed). However, in zoning its own
terrritory, the municipality is required to consider the relevant needs of the surround-
ing region. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 110-11, 378 N.Y.S.2d
672, 681, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242 (1975)(although town had sufficient housing to satisfy
its own present and future population, potential desire of residents of metropolitan
region to live in town had to be considered). This regional outlook is required
primarily of developing municipalities. See, e.g., Mt. Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 190, 336
A.2d at 733. Several elements are considered in determining whether a municipality
is "developing." See Glenview Development Co. v. Franklin Township, 164 N.J.
Super. 563, 567-68, 397 A.2d 384, 386 (1978). Essentially, the determination rests on
whether future growth is likely. See Villa, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., Old Forge
Borough, 57 Pa. Commw. 221, 225-26, 426 A.2d 1209, 1211-12 (1981). Such judicial
determinations have drawbacks in that they are made only after the fact and do not
allow for the exercise of sound planning. Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 224, 456 A.2d at
423. Accordingly, in reasserting its inclusionary mandate, the New Jersey Supreme
Court embraced the legislature's establishment of "growth" areas in its State Devel-
opment Guide Plan. Id. at 225-26, 456 A.2d at 423-24.
27. See Mt. Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 179, 336 A.2d at 727 (adequate housing for all
categories of population is "an absolute essential" in promoting general welfare).
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establish itself as a "haven for the well-to-do. '2 A zoning ordinance
which effectively precludes lower income housing is termed "exclu-
sionary. ' 29 Since exclusionary ordinances contravene the general wel-
fare, they are an invalid exercise of the police power. 30
Even where a municipality's zoning ordinance is not exclusionary
and allows for the construction of lower income housing, the private
construction industry's profit motives nevertheless may prevent units
from being built.3 1 In response to this economic reality, there have
been various attempts to encourage such construction.3 2 When a local
government uses the zoning ordinance toward this end, its effort
generally is termed "inclusionary" zoning. 33
B. Valid Inclusionary Ordinances
Inclusionary zoning ordinances are an example of flexible zoning
techniques. 34 These ordinances often use incentive zoning or manda-
tory "set-asides. ' 35 An incentive approach increases a residential de-
28. Mt. Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 170, 336 A.2d at 723 (record established that
township "through its zoning ordinances has exhibited economic discrimination in
that the poor have been deprived of adequate housing [and that the township has
used] resources solely for the betterment of middle and upper-income persons") (quot-
ing South Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 119 N.J.
Super. 164, 178 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972)).
29. See Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 91 Misc. 2d 80, 83, 397
N.Y.S.2d 302, 306, aff'd. 63 A.D.2d 731, 405 N.Y.S.2d 302 (2d Dep't 1978).
30. See Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d at 109, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680,
341 N.E.2d at 241-42 (primary goal of zoning ordinance must be to develop town as
balanced, cohesive community); Mt. Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 179-80, 336 A.2d at 727-28
(since exclusion of lower income individuals is contrary to general welfare, ordinance
which set requirements that increased housing costs beyond lower income affordabil-
ity exceeded limits of regulatory power).
31. Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92, 99, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832, 836 (2d
Dep't 1983)("zoning ordinances will go no further than determining what may or
may not be built... ")(emphasis in original). See also Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 260-
61, 456 A.2d at 442-43 (ordinances which merely allowed for lower income housing
pursuant to Mt. Laurel I would not themselves provide realistic opportunity for such
housing to be built).
32. Financial encouragement generally takes the form of subsidies, relaxation of
building codes to provide for "least cost housing," or tax abatements. See Mt. Laurel
II, 92 N.J. at 263, 277, 456 A.2d at 443, 451. The use of tax incentives to encourage
lower income housing construction is discussed in Note, New York City's J-51 Pro-
grain: Controversy and Revision, 12 FORDFIAM URB. L.J. 103, 107-18 (1984).
33. See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 266, 456 A.2d at 445. See generally Comment,
Inclusionary Zoning: An Alternative For Connecticut Municipalities, 14 CONN. L.
REV. 789 (1982)[hereinafter cited as lnclusionary Zoning].
34. Flexible zoning is discussed supra at notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
35. See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 266, 456 A.2d at 445 (describing types of
affirmative measures available to municipalities to fulfill their Mt. Laurel obliga-
tions). See generally Fox and Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide Low and
1984]
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velopment's density in exchange for the developer's voluntary inclu-
sion within the development of housing units that lower income
individuals can afford. 3 A mandatory set-aside requires the residen-
tial developer to provide units for lower income residents.3 7
In Mt. Laurel II, after finding that a restrictive zoning ordinance
was only the most recent manifestation of the town's long history of
excluding lower income individuals, the New Jersey Supreme Court
ordered the use of inclusionary zoning techniques to remedy the exclu-
sion. 38 The court, while conceding that the issue more properly is left
to the legislature, contended that the constitutional rights identified in
Mt. Laurel 139 warrant a judicial determination of a community's fair
share of regional housing needs and a court order that the necessary
amount of lower income housing be constructed.40
The New York Court of Appeals has not been as willing to grant
affirmative relief once an ordinance has been declared exclusionary,
firmly maintaining in Berenson v. Town of New Castle4 1 that the tasks
of regional planning belong to the legislature. 42 Upon remand from
the Court of Appeals, the Berenson trial court ordered the town to
provide 3500 units of lower income housing. 4' The Appellate Division
Moderate Cost Housing, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1015 (1976)[hereinafter cited as
Bonus Zoning]; Freilich and Ragsdale, Timing and Sequential Controls-The Essen-
tial Basis for Effective Regional Planning: An Analysis of the New Directions for
Land Use Control in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Region, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 1009, 1086-88 (1974)(proposing use of incentive zoning to encourage low and
moderate income housing); Marcus, Zoning Exactions Employed to Solve Housing
Problems, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5, 1983, at 1, col. 3 (reporting use of incentive zoning in
Miami); Gottlieb, Towver Zoning Leads to Bitter Court Fight, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18,
1983, at Bl1, col. 1 (New York City Mayor Edward Koch is considering incentive
zoning program).
36. Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 266, 456 A.2d at 445. See generally Bonus Zoning,
supra note 35, at 1026-27.
37. Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 267-68, 456 A.2d at 446-50. See generally Rose, The
Mandatory Percentage of Moderately Priced Dwvelling Ordinance (MPMPD) Is the
Latest Technique of Inclusionary Zoning, 3 REAL ESTATE L.J. 176 (1974).
38. See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 265, 456 A.2d at 445. Such a mandate raises
questions as to the judiciary's proper role upon declaring a zoning ordinance invalid.
See generally Note, The Rezoning Dilemma: What May a Court Do With an Invalid
Zoning Classification?, 25 S.D. L. REV. 116 (1980).
39. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713.
40. Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 212-13, 456 A.2d at 417. This decision that courts
should determine a town's "fair share" and direct that it be provided has been decried
as a "Communist" concept which could lead to "judicial chaos." Hanlev, Some Jersey
Towns, Yielding to Courts, Let in Modest Hounes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1984, at Al,
col. I (quoting New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean). Governor Kean instead pro-
posed legislation to encourage towns to rezone before courts step in. Id. at B5, col. 5.
41. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 341 N.E.2d 236 (1975).
42. Id. at 111, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 682, 341 N.E.2d at 243.
43. 67 A.D.2d 506, 512-13, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669, 673 (2d Dep't 1979).
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vacated the order, holding that the trial court's authority was limited
to finding the ordinance unconstitutional and ordering its amend-
ment; the court could not order the construction of housing units. 44
In Blitz v. Town of New Castle45 the amended ordinance was
challenged as exclusionary because it allowed for lower income units
without requiring their actual construction. 46 The ordinance sought to
encourage building through various incentives to those residential
developers who included lower income units.47 It included no manda-
tory provisions, and the court held that none were required. The court
upheld the ordinance, finding that the function of a zoning ordinance
is not, as the plaintiffs had contended, "to provide affirmatively for
the creation of all necessary housing. ' 48
Thus, incentives used to provide lower income housing are valid
zoning exercises in New York. 49 The language of the Blitz court leaves
unanswered, however, the question of the validity of an ordinance
which requires that lower income housing units be provided.
Where the courts have required mandatory inclusionary zoning
programs, the programs are valid.5 0 Where housing unit requirements
are established independently by a municipality, however, both their
validity5' and their value52 have been challenged. Where such manda-
44. Id. at 521-22, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 678-79.
45. 94 A.D.2d 92, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832 (2d Dep't 1983).
46. Id. at 98-99, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
47. Id. at 94-95, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 833-34.
48. Id. at 99, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
49. Id. (zoning ordinance may encourage construction of lower income housing
by including incentive density bonus provisions); Trinity Place Co. v. Finance Ad-
min'r of the City of New York, 38 N.Y.2d 144, 379 N.Y.S.2d 16, 341 N.E.2d 536
(1975). In Trinity Place the plaintiff had agreed to an arrangement which allowed
him to exceed the height limitations on one parcel in exchange for dedication of the
adjoining parcel as a park. Plaintiff initiated the suit to contest a tax assessment
which valued the dedicated parcel at an amount equal to its value prior to the
dedication. Plaintiff contended that, because development on the parcel was pre-
cluded, it was essentially valueless. 38 N.Y.2d at 147, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 18, 341
N.E.2d at 538. The court characterized the arrangement as an example of incentive
zoning. Id. at 149-50, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 20-21, 341 N.E.2d at 539-40. It noted the
benefits which the city may gain by such arrangements and, emphasizing the negoti-
ated nature of the arrangement, refused to find the land valueless for assessment
purposes. Id.
50. Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 271, 456 A.2d at 448 (mandatory inclusionary
devices are constitutional where necessary to satisfy Mt. Laurel obligation). Refer-
ring to the New Jersey state constitution, the court stated that "it would take a clear
contrary constitutional provision to lead us to conclude that that which is necessary
to achieve the constitutional mandate is prohibited by the same Constitution." Id. at
273, 456 A.2d at 449. For a discussion of inclusionary zoning as a duty rather than a
choice, see Bonus Zoning, supra note 35, at 1022-24.
51. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. DeGroff Enters., Inc., 214 Va.
235, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973). The Board enacted an ordinance which required a 15%
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tory programs have been proposed, their validity has been urged by
analogy to the common suburban practice of conditioning develop-
ment approval on the developer's providing some benefit to the com-
munity in mitigation of the anticipated effects of the development. 53
Determining whether this analogy supports mandatory housing inclu-
sions requires an analysis of the differences between requiring a subur-
ban developer to supply parkland or road improvement and requiring
a city commercial developer to provide lower income housing units.
III. The Requirements of Conditions Placed Upon Development
The practice of inclusionary zoning has been applied only to subur-
ban settings where growth is occurring or likely. 54 Flexible zoning
set-aside as a condition to plan approval. Id. at 235-36, 198 S.E.2d at 601. The court
acknowledged that providing low and moderate income housing serves a legitimate
goal. Id. at 237, 198 S.E.2d at 601. Nevertheless, the court found the ordinance
invalid, because (1) it exceeded the statutory grant of power; (2) its use of socio-
economic zoning was an improper exercise of the police power; and (3) it authorized
an uncompensated taking of property. Id. at 238, 198 S.E.2d at 602. See also Annot.,
62 A.L.R.3d 880 (1975)(analyzing DeGroff Enterprises).
Proponents of mandatory set-asides argue that they will be upheld in other juris-
dictions. See Rose, The Transfer of Development Rights: A Preview of an Evolving
Concept, 3 REAL ESTATE L.J. 330, 350 (1975). The New Jersey Supreme Court
expressly reserved the issue of the validity of mandatory set-asides in Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 518-19, 371 A.2d 1192, 1210
(1977). However, the court later held mandatory set-asides permissible where neces-
sary to correct a history of exclusionary policy. Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 271, 456
A.2d 448. A Pennsylvania appellate court also has reserved judgment on the ques-
tion. See Raum v. Board of Supervisors of Tredyffrin Township, 20 Pa. Commw.
426, 443-44, 342 A.2d 450, 458-59 (1975). New York also has not ruled on the issue.
See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
52. See Ellickson, Inclusionary Housing Programs: Yet Another Misguided Ur-
ban Policy?, prepared for Inclusionary Zoning Moves Downtown: A Legal Sympo-
sium, at C.U.N.Y. Graduate Center, New York, New York (Nov. 14, 1983)[hereinaf-
ter cited as Symposium]. (The papers and proceedings of the symposium will be
published in 1984 by the Planners Press of the American Planning Association. To
order copies contact the Center for Metropolitan Action, Queens College, Flushing,
New York 11367). Professor Ellickson criticizes inclusionary zoning as a tax on new
development. Id. at 3. In addition, Ellickson feels that the "in-kind" housing subsi-
dies provided by these programs are less helpful than cash payments. Id. at 5.
Finally, according to Ellickson, these programs link taxing and spending policies so
that funds cannot be diverted if necessary, and spending is insulated from normal
political review. Id. at 7.
53. Draft Proposal, supra note 25, at 21 (proposed zoning amendment based on
traditional mitigation rationale). See also Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances and the
Nexus Issue, Symposium, supra note 52, at 10-12 (inclusionary requirements are
justified as exactions based on need created by the development). Cf. Lesk, Theatre
Fund and Housing Trust Fund Issues, Symposium, supra note 52, at 7-9 (mitigation
theory may not fulfill requirements of New York enabling act).
54. See Inclusionary Zoning, supra note 33, at 789. See generally Symposium:
Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 465 (1971).
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provisions seek to derive public benefit from private development
initiative. 55 Where there is no such initiative, neither coercion nor
coaxing yields results. 56 Rather than wait for private initiative in
residential areas that need new construction and rehabilitation, sev-
eral cities have sought to tap development initiative where it already
exists .57
This Note will examine the element of these programs that requires
commercial developers either to construct or to pay for lower income
housing units. 58 As stated, proponents argue that support for this
approach can be found through analogy to conditions placed upon
development approval. 59
Assuming that the analogy supports imposing conditions on residen-
tial development, 60 there are two critical differences when these con-
ditions are imposed on commercial development. First, the housing is
planned for some location off-site from the regulated development.
Second, the housing is conditioned upon commercial development. 61
The question of validity, as with any zoning enactment, turns on the
ordinance's relationship to the police power and on whether the ena-
bling act grants the city authority to engage in such a practice.
55. Euclid to Ramapo, supra note 15, at 56-57.
56. Id. at 56 n.1 ("[z]oning admittedly has minimal impact in areas where
private investment is unprofitable").
57. See supra notes 5, 23, 31-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of
attempts to encourage private development initiative.
58. See Brooks, Lessons to Learn From Inclusionary Zoning, in Symposium,
supra note 52, at 1 (Boston and Seattle programs); Fulton, The City Takes Its Cut, 47
PLANNING, No. 9, 23 (Sept. 1981)(San Francisco program); Marcus, Zoning Exac-
tions Employed to Solve Housing Problems, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5, 1983, at 1, col. 3
(Miami program); Sedway, The San Francisco Office Housing Production Program,
in Symposium, supra note 52, at 1-2.
59. See Rose, The Transfer of Development Rights: A Preview of an Evolving
Concept, 3 REAL ESTATE L.J. 330, 350 (1975). Mandatory set-asides are discussed
supra at note 51 and accompanying text.
60. The question of whether a city's residential development validly can be zoned
to require an inclusion of lower income units is discussed in Note, Municipalities and
the Increasing Need for Low and Moderate Income Housing, 28 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 408 (1971).
61. Lesk, Theatre Fund and Housing Trust Fund Issues in Symposium, supra
note 52, at 7. Lesk includes a third distinction which is an amalgam of the first two.
Since the benefit is housing away from 'the site, the area around the development is
left with the detrimental effects which justified taking the exaction initially. Id. The
premise of flexible zoning is that development has a negative impact on an area
which can be offset by requiring the developer to provide certain benefits. See supra
notes 17-21 and accompanying text. When the development is permitted in exchange
for a benefit to a different area of the city, the development area is left with the
burden and no ameliorative amenity.
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A. Housing Construction As A Condition
Conditional approvals reflect New York City's planning function.
62
The terms of a particular exaction, however, must be contemplated
by the enabling act,63 which is strictly construed.
64
New York City may condition approval of a subdivision plat.6 5
Conditions may be premised on the need for adequate housing. 6 The
developer may be required to construct sewers and watermains, to
provide transportation within the development area or to dedicate a
portion of the subdivision as streets or parkland.6 7 The statute does
62. Holmes v. Planning Bd., 78 A.D.2d 1, 14, 433 N.Y.S.2d 587, 596 (2d Dep't
1980)(problems such as traffic congestion generally are not addressed by zoning
schemes because they require broader and more flexible outlook).
63. id. at 11-12, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 594-95.
64. See, e.g., Kamhi v. Planning Bd., 59 N.Y.2d 385, 390-91, 465 N.Y.S.2d 865,
867-68, 452 N.E.2d 1193, 1195-96 (1983). In Kainhi, the court held that where the
statute permits "conditions on the ownership, use, and maintenance" of land, it does
not authorize a requirement of dedication or conveyance of land. Id. at 388 n. 1, 392,
465 N.Y.S.2d at 866 n.1, 868, 452 N.E.2d at 1194 n.1, 1196. Similarly, where it
authorizes dedication, the statute does not permit the conditioning of permit ap-
proval upon an outright conveyance. Id. These are fine distinctions which underscore
the importance of the enabling act. In contrast, the appellate division, examining
legislative history, had concluded that a dedication was comprehended as a condition
on ownership. Kamhi v. Planning Bd., 89 A.D.2d 111, 118-19, 454 N.Y.S.2d 875,
885 (2d Dep't 1982).
65. A subdivision plat proposes a plan to subdivide a tract of land into parcels for
separate sale; a site plan is a development proposal for a single lot owned by a single
individual. See Holmes v. Planning Bd., 78 A.D.2d at 16, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
66. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 32 (McKinney 1968)("[f]or the purpose of providing
for the future growth and development of the city and affording adequate facilities
for the housing . . . of its population" city may empower its planning board to
approve or reject plats).
67. Friends of the Pine Bush v. Planning Bd., 86 A.D.2d 246, 248, 450 N.Y.S.2d
966, 968 (3d Dep't 1982), aff'd, 59 N.Y.2d 849, 465 N.Y.S.2d 924, 452 N.E.2d 1252
(1983)(a city is given power to condition subdivision plat approval upon such condi-
tions listed in N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 33 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984)). See also
Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 85, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 958, 218
N.E.2d 673, 676 (1966) (influx of people was sufficiently attributable to subdivision
to permit requirement that parkland be dedicated or that fee be paid in lieu of
dedication); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 617, 137
N.W.2d 442, 447 (1965)(same).
To meet the imposed condition, the developer actually must construct the required
improvements or post a performance bond. The only option open to a city is to waive
the requirements, bdt if the city has established requirements, it cannot waive the
developer's obligation to either construct or pay for those requirements in favor of
some other arrangement. Friends of the Pine Bush, 86 A.D.2d at 249, 450 N.Y.S.2d
at 968-69 (developers were to petition city council to have city install improvements
and assess costs to property owners). Furthermore, where the statute has not been
complied with strictly, plat approval must be nullified. Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v.
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not, however, specifically authorize a requirement that a developer
provide housing. 68
The city may condition approval of a site plan6 9 upon the devel-
oper's assuming a reasonable share of the burden that the develop-
ment will place upon the community. 70 The city may determine in
advance what improvements will be required of site plans within a
given district and incorporate them into its zoning ordinance as condi-
tions of approval. 7' The burdens which may be eased by conditional
site plan approval and the elements which may be required in a site
plan are listed in the General City Law. 72 The list does not expressly
allow inclusion of a housing unit requirement as an element of any
Planning Bd., 96 A.D.2d 986, 988, 466 N.Y.S.2d 828, 832 (3d Dep't 1983)(statute
required construction or payment prior to approval; where neither took place,
approval was void).
68. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 33(McKinney 1968)(prior to approval, planning
board must impose conditions regarding streets, highways and parks, and require
that needed improvements actually be undertaken by developer). See also Friends of
the Pine Bush, 86 A.D.2d at 249, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 968-69 (planning board could
waive condition that improvements be made).
69. See supra note 65.
70. Holnes v. Planning Bd., 78 A.D.2d at 21, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 600 (requirement
that developer give reciprocal parking easement to neighboring property with inten-
tion of alleviating traffic congestion was reasonable condition for site plan approval).
71. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 30-a(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984)(ordinance
"shall specify the uses ... required and the elements to be included" as determined
by planning board). There is no similar provision for including conditions of subdivi-
sion plat approval within the zoning ordinance. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 33
(McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
72. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 30-a(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). A city
may:
as part of a zoning ordinance . . . authorize the planning board to review
... site plans, prepared to specifications set forth in the said zoning
ordinance .... Such ordinance . . . shall specify the uses for which such
approval shall be required and the elements to be included in such plans
submitted for approval; such elements may include, where appropriate,
those relating to parking, means of access, screening, signs, landscaping,
architectural features, location and dimensions of buildings, impact of the
proposed use on adjacent land uses and such other elements as mav reason-
ably be related to the health, safety and general welfare of the commu-
nity.
Id.
The same power is granted to towns, N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-a (McKinney Supp.
1983-1984), and villages. N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 7-725 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
See 1977 Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. 200 (1977): Riegert Apartments Corp. v. Planning Bd.
of the Town of Clarkstown, 57 N.Y.2d 206, 213, 455 N.Y.S.2d 558, 562, 441 N.E.2d
1076, 1080 (1982) (legislative intent was to give uniform grant of pdwer to all munici-
palities in state).
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conditional approval. 73 The list concludes, however, with an authori-
zation for the city to include "such other elements as may reasonably
be related to the health, safety and general welfare of the commu-
nity. ' 74 Any authority to include specific housing unit requirements
must be implied from this broad authorization.
This grant of authority regarding the general welfare is not as broad
as the state's police power, 75 nor does it vest the city with authority to
address general community problems through zoning ordinances.7
However, the city's authority cannot be narrowly confined and has
been held to support a zoning ordinance enacted to provide sufficient
housing for the aged.7 7 In the face of an acute housing shortage for
lower income people, a zoning ordinance to provide for those housing
needs also should come within the city's delegated police power.7 8
73. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 30-a(l)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). Housing is
not included in the list of allowable elements.
74. Id. There is no similarly broad grant with respect to the types of conditions
which may be placed on subdivision plat approval. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 33
(McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
75. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
76. Golden v. Planning Bd. of the Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 371 n.5, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, 146 n.5, 285 N.E.2d 291, 297 n.5 (1972)(requirement that future
development take place only after adequate support facilities had been provided in
location of development was valid in that it was not directed at any general problem
but at problems which would be created by development in areas which did not have
adequate facilities).
77. Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 484-85, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, 389, 330
N.E.2d 403, 405 (1975)(breadth of police power grant to regulate land use for
community's general welfare embraced town's purpose of meeting need for adequate
housing for aged). See also Marcus Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 45 N.Y.2d
501, 410 N.Y.S.2d 546, 382 N.E.2d 1323 (1978)(upholding as within grant of police
power a zoning ordinance which regulated population density in industrial use zone).
78. Accord Note, Municipalities and the Increasing Need for Low and Moderate
Income Housing, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 408 (1971). The author argues that the
shortage alone is so detrimental to the general welfare that the action taken to
alleviate it is within the police power. Id. at 412. The Virginia Supreme Court,
however, has held that an attempt to require construction of lower income housing is
socio-economic zoning and thus is impermissible under the same rationale that
prohibits exclusionary zoning. See Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enters., 214 Va.
235, 238, 198 S.E.2d 600. 602 (1973); accord Mindel v. Township Council, 167 N.J.
Super. 461, 467, 400 A.2d 1244, 1247 (1979)(zoning ordinance which permitted
lower income housing could not be used to compel owner of rural land to construct
housing). But see Borough of Kinnelon v. South Gate Assocs., 172 N.J. Super. 216,
219, 411 A.2d 724, 725 (App. Div. 1980)(disapproving Mindel to extent it suggests
that ordinance may not restrict or condition use of land for commercial farming in
light of housing needs); Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 267-68, 456 A.2d at 446 (where
towns had pursued course of exclusionary zoning, proper to mandate that they
require developers to provide lower income housing units).
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B. Requiring Housing Construction Off-Site
Even if lower income housing may be required within a develop-
ment as a condition for its approval, a different problem is presented
when the housing units exacted from a developer are not part of the
development itself.79 If conditions or exactions are to be valid, the
burden they place on the developer must be related to the burden that
the development itself causes the city.80 As long as the conditions
exacted from the developer are attributable in this way to the develop-
ment, exactions are valid even where they might be said to overcom-
pensate the public by providing a benefit that outweighs the burden
imposed by the development.8 '
The requirement that the exaction be attributable to the develop-
ment necessitates some proximity between the improvement and the
property.8 2 Approval may be granted or denied based on a consider-
ation of the impact the development will have upon property through-
out the jurisdiction. 3 Approval of a project cannot, however, be
conditioned upon the developer's making improvements outside the
area of the development itself.8 4 A city can preclude any negative
79. See Golden v. Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 378, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152, 285 N.E.2d
at 302 (difficulties attending exactions of off-site improvements, particularly ques-
tions of constitutionality, indicate preferability of suspending development until
necessary improvements are achieved by other means).
80. Holmes v. Planning Bd., 78 A.D.2d 1, 17-18, 433 N.Y.S.2d 587, 598-99 (2d
Dep't 1980). The standard first was enunciated in Pioneer Trust and Sav. Bank v.
Village of Mt. Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961), which required that
the burden be "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the development. Id. at
380, 176 N.E.2d at 802. This standard has not been "so restr ictively applied as to cast
an unreasonable burden of proof upon the municipality .... " Jordan v. Village of
Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 617, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447 (1965).
81. Holnes v. Planning Bd., 78 A.D.2d at 20-21, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (condition
is reasonable since premised on exacerbation of traffic congestion expected from
proposed development; irrelevant that condition will alleviate. existing traffic conges-
tion and benefit public generally).
82. Id. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE
L.J. 75, 112 (1973).
83. Pearson Kent Corp. v. Bear, 28 N.Y.2d 396, 398, 322 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237, 271
N.E.2d 218, 219 (1971)(denial of subdivision plat premised on determination that
existing access roads would not support increased traffic).
84. Valmont Homes, Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 89 Misc. 2d 702, 704, 392
N.Y.S.2d 806, 808 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1977)(city had no authority to require
developer to improve existing access road outside of proposed site); Peckham Indus.,
Inc. v. Ross, 61 Misc. 2d 616, 617, 306 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1009 (Sup. Ct. Orange
County), affd, 34 A.D.2d 826, 312 N.Y.S.2d 627 (2d Dep't 1970)(saine). This
distinction between on-site and off-site exactions first was drawn in Medine v. Burns,
29 Misc. 2d 890, 208 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1960). In Medine, Justice
Bernard Meyer, currently of the New York Court of Appeals, found- no statutory
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effect outside the development area by denying approval of the proj-
ect.8 5 Alternatively, a city may alleviate negative effects by suspend-
ing development until necessary improvements have been made. 86
In Golden v. Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo,87 the town
established a comprehensive capital improvement plan to supply
needed support facilities while suspending development until the im-
provements were complete.88 The town provided, however, that if
private concerns made the improvements prior to their scheduled
completion by the town, the development ban would be lifted when
the facilities were in place.89 The town included among the necessary
facilities not merely sewage and street improvements, but also suffi-
cient lower income housing to meet its share of the regional need. 90
The town did not require developers to build lower income hous-
ing. Instead, it allowed them to do so to hasten construction approval
for their more profitable housing units. Thus, the town was able to
acquire privately constructed lower income housing indirectly. 9' New
York City's use of the same approach should be valid considering the
uniform grant of zoning power to the several municipal entities.9 2
authorization for access road improvement as a conditon of plat approval. Id. at 891-
92, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 14-15. The statutes instead allowed for such a requirement only
as a condition for a building permit. Id. at 892, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 14-15. See also
Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 52 N.J. 348, 350-51, 245 A.2d 336, 337-38
(1968)(off-site exaction impermissible since not expressly authorized by statute and
thus no procedure existed to apportion cost on basis of benefits to development site).
85. Pearson Kent Corp., 28 N.Y.2d at 399, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 237-38, 271 N.E.2d
at 219-20.
86. Golden v. Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 366, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142, 285 N.E.2d at
294 ("pressures of an increase in population and the ancillary problem of providing
facilities and services" justified suspending residential development until adequate
facilities existed at proposed site since town had planned to provide facilities). See
also Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 604-07, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 41, 53-55, 557 P.2d 473, 485-87 (1976) (upholding similar suspension of residen-
tial development until educational standards and support facility requirements were
met).
87. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291, appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972).
88. Id. at 366-68, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142-43, 285 N.E.2d at 294-96.
89. Id. at 368-69, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144, 285 N.E.2d at 296.
90. Id. at 366-68, 380, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143-44, 153, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 303.
91. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text regarding the implication that,
in New York, direct requirements that housing be built are not viewed with favor.
See also DeGroff Enterprises, discussed supra at note 51, where such direct require-
ments were invalidated.
92. See Riegert Apartments Corp. v. Planning Bd., 57 N.Y.2d 206, 213, 455
N.Y.S.2d 558, 562, 441 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (1982)(legislative intent was to give
uniform grant of power to all state municipalities).
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C. Requiring Housing Construction By Commercial Developers
The restrictions that are imposed upon development to minimize its
detrimental effects must bear a reasonable relationship to those ef-
fects. 93 The central concept is the relationship between the use and the
condition placed upon it. 94 Where municipalities seek to exact lower
income housing from commercial developers, commercial develop-
ment must be shown to have a reasonable relationship to the shortage
of lower income housing; that is, the shortage must be attributable to
commercial development.
In New York City there has been a steady increase in the number of
service industry jobs95 and a simultaneous decrease in the number of
housing units available for lower income individuals. 96 This trend has
93. Holmes v. Planning Bd., 78 A.D.2d 1, 19, 433 N.Y.S.2d 587, 598-99 (2d
Dep't 1980)(interpreting Jenad, supra note 67, as requiring reasonable relationship
between foreseeable problems caused by proposed development and conditions
placed on development). See Collard v. Incorporated Village of Flower Hill, 52
N.Y.2d 594, 602, 439 N.Y.S.2d 326, 330, 421 N.E.2d 818, 822 (1981)(had conditions
been challenged, standard would have been whether conditions limiting building size
and types of professional use and requiring shrubbery reasonably were related to
"minimizing the potentially deleterious effect of a zoning change on neighboring
properties"); Pleasant Valley Home Constr., Ltd. v. VanWagner, 41 N.Y.2d 1028,
395 N.Y.S.2d 631, 363 N.E.2d 1376 (1977)(although approval of mobile home devel-
opment could not be denied based on community pressure, city could place condi-
tions on development which would alleviate feared impact); Oakwood Island Yacht
Club v. Board of Appeals, 32 Misc. 2d 677, 223 N.Y.S.2d 907 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1961)(city could not condition approval of plan to construct yacht club on
private island on owner's improvement of housing that adjoined proposed develop-
ment site). See also House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d
384, 388-89, 153 P.2d 950, 952 (1944)(district's drainage of water over plaintiff's land
was not justified under police power because it "extend[ed] beyond the necessities of
the case"); Liberty v. California Coastal Comm'n, 113 Cal. App. 3d 491, 503-04, 170
Cal. Rptr. 247, 254-55 (4th Dist. 1980)(same; county could not shift to private party
its own burden of assuring presence of sufficient beach-side parking by requiring that
private lot be free to public during day); Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 412, 417, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872, 879-80 (3d Dist. 1969)(sine qua non of
exaction's reasonableness is fulfillment of public needs emanating from proposed land
use; needs may be to protect community from deleterious effects of, or to meet public
service demands created by, proposal).
94. See Conditional Zoning, supra note 17, at 200 (condition "unrelated to the
use to which the property will be put or . . unreasonably onerous given the use" is
invalid).
95. Stetson, Jobs in New York City Rose To A 10-Year High in 1983, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 23, 1984, at B6, col. 1 (gain concentrated in service, trade and finance-
insurance-real estate sectors); Sulzberger, 25 % More Workers To Crowd Midtown in
80's, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 3 (reporting study of likely environ-
mental consequences of expected addition of 150,000 office workers during decade).
96. See Housing's Best Hope, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1983, A18, col. 1 ("need for
decent moderate-income housing far exceeds any effort to promote it... "); Perma-
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been asserted as a justification for requiring commercial developers to
contribute to easing the housing shortage. 97 The rationale is that it is
reasonable to require a commercial developer to provide lower in-
come housing, since the development will increase the number of
people in need of such housing.9 8 This rationale, however, may be
overly broad. An equally compelling and consistent analogy could be
formulated to support a requirement that the developer improve the
transit, educational or recreational facilities which these new residents
will use. 99
Commercial development by its nature has an undesirable effect
when it takes place within or adjacent to a residential zone.' 0 Resi-
dential additions also hamper enterprises in a commercial zone.' 0
This is the basic justification for separating the uses. 102 Because of this
natural deleterious effect, commercial developers can be required to
include improvements to minimize the physical or aesthetic impact of
the project on adjacent residential property.'0 °
nent Lodging For Homeless, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1983, A30, col. I (loss of 81,000
units in last decade and waiting list of 150,000 families for public housing mean only
greater commitment to lower income housing can resolve problem of increasing
number of homeless in New York City).
97. Sullivan, Testimony to the Mayor's Development Commitment Study Com-
mission, Board of Estimate Chambers 2-3 (Sept. 22, 1983).
98. Id.
99. See Marcus, Zoning Exactions Employed to Solve Housing Problems,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5, 1983, 1, col. 3 (criticizing attempts to exact housing from commer-
cial developers as contrary to fundamental assumptions of zoning and comprising
instead attempts to redistribute wealth). See also FIlton, The City Takes Its Cut, 47
PLANNINc No. 9 at 23, 24 (Sept. 1981)(reporting proposal by San Francisco's mayor
to require owners of downtown skyscrapers to subsidize transit fares).
100. Town of Huntington v. Park Shore Country Day Camp of Dix Hills, Inc., 47
N.Y.2d 61, 66-67, 416 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776-77, 390 N.E.2d 282, 284-85 (1979)(ordi-
nance validly prohibited commercial tennis courts from residential district even
though it allowed courts in nonprofit clubs; pursuit of pecuniary profits of commer-
cial enterprise render it more burdensome than same enterprise conducted on non-
profit basis).
101. See 1 R. ANDERSON, NEW YORK ZONING AND PRACTICE § 8.22, at 361
(1973)("[i]t seems clearly established that residential uses injure commercial districts"
by diluting the effect of a "shopping area where all may prosper").
102. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)(whether
particular uses may be restricted requires consideration of proposed use as well as
circumstances; even if it is "merely a right thing in the wrong place,-like a pig in
the parlor instead of the barnyard--use may be prohibited from an area).
103. Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 259, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866, 869, 168
N.E.2d 680, 683 (1960)(portion of residential area rezoned for business use may
require, as conditions, improvements to minimize annoyance created by businesses).
Conditions included as part of a rezoning are analogous to conditions attached to site
plan approval. See Miracle Mile Assocs. v. Department of Envtl. Conserv., 73
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The conditions imposed in such instances are supported by a reason-
able relationship between the commercial development and the effect
to be diminished, since the effect and the conditions are physical and
immediately discernible. 0 4 Where it is alleged that commercial devel-
opment affects the city-wide need for lower income housing, the
relationship is statistical rather than physical. °5
The legal difficulty, however, is whether such a statistical correla-
tion is sufficient to satisfy the standard that conditions placed on a
development must be reasonably related to its proposed use.'0 6 The
standard is not inherently violated by the fact that the relationship is
shown through statistical projections.' 0 7 Statistical projections of the
future effects of development are merely a reflection of planning
attempts. 0 8 However, conditions premised upon such anticipated ef-
fects must be consistent with a city's comprehensive plan for manag-
ing future growth. 0 9
A.D.2d 807, 807-08, 423 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (4th Dep't 1979)(having given final
approval to site plan, town could not place further conditions upon development by
zoning change). Ameliorative conditions also may be placed upon development
which is the subject of a variance application. North Shore Steak House v. Board of
Appeals, 30 N.Y.2d 238, 244, 331 N.Y.S.2d 645, 649, 282 N.E.2d 606, 609
(1972)(section of plot on which restaurant operated was in residential zone; variance
to allow its use for additional restaurant parking was properly subject to conditions
"to minimize its impact on the surrounding area").
104. In Church v. Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866, 168 N.E.2d 680 (1960),
the zoning conditions required that no building cover more than 25% of the tract and
that the property be surrounded by both live shrubbery and a fence. Id. at 257, 203
N.Y.S.2d at 867, 168 N.E.2d at 681. In Collard, 52 N.Y.2d 594, 439 N.Y.S.2d 326,
421 N.E.2d 818 (1981), the conditions similarly were directed toward limiting the
construction of eyesores and also sought to keep the level of intensity of use at a
minimum. Id. at 602, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 330, 421 N.E.2d at 822. See also Dexter v.
Town Bd., 36 N.Y.2d 102, 105, 365 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508, 324 N.E.2d 870, 871
(1975) (condition which limited rezoning to benefit only current owner of parcel was
invalid since "zoning deals basically with land use .... [Clonditions and safeguards
must be reasonable and relate only to the real estate involved . . .").
105. See supra note 104 for a discussion of particular conditions.
106. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text,
107. See, e.g., Holnes, 78 A.D.2d at 21, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 600 (statistical correla-
tions evidencing likelihood of increased traffic congestion from development had
supported other regulations and could have been used to support conditional zoning
ordinance but were not necessary).
108. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 31 (McKinney 1968)(planning board has power to
"make such investigations . . . relating to the planning and development of the city
as to it seems desirable . . ."). See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the importance of a city's planning for the future.
109. See Conditional Zoning, supra note 17, at 204-09 (discussing requirement
that rezoning conditions be in accordance with a plan).
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IV. The Requirements Of A Comprehensive Plan
Conditions upon and exactions from development must be in ac-
cordance with a comprehensive plan. "10 Restrictions on a landowner's
free use of property must be justified by the community's needs and
goals."' These needs and goals must be articulated in a comprehensive
plan that represents a rational statement of land use control poli-
cies. 1 1 2
The comprehensive plan need not be a written document." 3 It may
be discernible from the community's patterns of zoning." 4 However,
the basis upon which zoning proceeds should be as clear and specific
as possible to establish compliance with the enabling act."15 The plan
is not required to be static. As needs become apparent, alterations of
land use policies and development plans may be necessary." 6 While
comprehensive planning is required, a particular plan can be modi-
fied. 1 17
Essentially, comprehensive planning requires a community to con-
sider its foreseeable land use goals and needs."" Local officials must
anticipate both the potential problems and alternative courses of
action which can minimize adverse effects upon landowners." 9
Where such foresight is shown, courts are reluctant to displace the
legislature's chosen means of achieving proper ends and planning for
110. A zoning ordinance that is not adopted in accordance with a comprehensive
plan exceeds the grant of the enabling act and is therefore ultra vires. Udell v. Haas,
21 N.Y.2d 463, 476, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 899, 235 N.E.2d 897, 904-05 (1968)(after
adoption of ordinance, town sought suggestions from professionals of plans which
would justify ordinance). In the case of a city in New York State, the plan must be
"well considered" with respect to promoting the public health, safety and general
welfare. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20, subd. 25 (McKinney 1968).
111. Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d at 476, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899, 235 N.E.2d at 904-05.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 471, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 895, 235 N.E.2d at 902. But see Larsen and
Siemon, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan"--The Myth Revisited, 1979
INST. ON PLAN. ZONINC & EMINENT DOMAIN 105, 130-32 (criticizing Udell for not
requiring actual enunciation of plan).
114. Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d at 471, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 895, 235 N.E.2d at 902.
115. Id. at 470, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894, 235 N.E.2d at 901.
116. Kravetz v. Plenge, 84 A.D.2d 422, 429, 446 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (4th Dep't
1982)(amendment to allow hotel development in residential historic district not
contrary to comprehensive plan since it was enacted for betterment of community
and reflected considerable forethought).
117. Town of Bedford v. Village of Mt. Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 188, 351 N.Y.S.2d
129, 136, 306 N.E.2d 155, 159 (1973)("It]he obligation is support of comprehensive
planning, not slavish servitude to any particular comprehensive plan").
118. Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d at 470, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894, 235 N.E.2d at 901.
119. Id.
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future needs. 120 A challenger of the legislative solution must prove that
the ordinance, adopted pursuant to the confines of the enabling act, is
nonetheless an improper exercise of the delegated police power. '21
The existence of a comprehensive plan has supported zoning actions
which set aside areas to house the aged, 122 conditioned commercial
development upon the developer's mitigation of anticipated ill ef-
fects123 and postponed development until the foreseeable needs of the
community were met.124 However, where the plan is offered as a mere
rationalization for the ordinance rather than as a true attempt to
anticipate and solve the community's land use problems, the require-
ment of the enabling act has not been met. 125
Thus, a zoning amendment which exacted housing units from a
commercial development would have to be based on a city's determi-
nation that lower income housing is a need which can be met least
obtrusively by such an exaction. 126 This determination then would
have to be evidenced by a change in the city's land use policies. 127 The
city could not adopt such a proposal merely as an inexpensive way of
addressing the housing problem generally.1 2 Nor could the enactment
be based only on the community's desire to provide lower income
housing. 2 9 An amendment which included such an exaction could be
adopted only if it were indicated as an appropriate response to antici-
pated land use problems, as addressed in a comprehensive plan.3 0
120. Golden v. Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at376-77,334 N.Y.S.2d at 151, 285 N.E.2d at
301.
121. Id. at 377, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 151, 285 N.E.2d at 301; Kravetz v. Plenge, 84
A.D.2d at 430, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11.
122. Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 485, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, 389, 330 N.E.2d
403, 405-06, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975).
123. Collard v. Incorporated Village of Flower Hill, 52 N.Y.2d 594, 602, 439
N.Y.S.2d 326, 330, 421 N.E.2d 818, 822 (1981).
124. Golden v. Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 380, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153, 285 N.E.2d at
303.
125. Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d at 471, 475, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 895, 899, 235 N.E.2d
at 902, 904.
126. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
128, See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
129. Golden v. Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 377, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 151-52, 285 N.E.2d at
301 (planning was required regardless of benefits which ordinance might be expected
to yield); Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d at 476, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899, 235 N.E.2d at 904-
05 (council's finding that it was the "feeling of the Village" that further business
development was not desirable did not fulfill requirement of comprehensive planning
in support of ordinance rezoning area to preclude such development)(emphasis in
original).
130. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
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V. Recommendations
Zoning ordinances which require commercial developers to provide
lower income housing units must be contemplated by the state's ena-
bling act. Additionally, they must not exceed the limits of the police
power delegated by the act. Both requirements anticipate an ordi-
nance which furthers the general welfare by satisfying such a funda-
mental zoning concern as the provision of sufficient housing.
Neither the enabling act nor the grant of police power will support
a direct requirement that a commercial developer provide needed
housing units. However, in furtherance of a comprehensive plan for
future growth and development problems, New York City could slow
the pace of commercial development until the need for lower income
housing units is under control. Pursuant to the City's police power, a
comprehensive plan could establish the reasonable relationship re-
quired to place such a condition upon growth.
The City should not restrict individual developments, but commer-
cial development generally. Continued commercial development
should be allowed only upon satisfaction of the need for sufficient
lower income housing which the City expects to be generated by
commercial development. The City itself must undertake a plan to
satisfy its need for lower income housing. Satisfaction of this need
must be a primary goal if New York City validly is to attempt to exact
from commercial developers the share of the lower income housing
need which their developments generate.
VI. Conclusion
New York City is faced with the problem of providing for its urgent
housing needs. The general need for lower income housing must be
made a primary goal of the City in addressing its land use problems.
Programs which offer an expedient solution through a mandatory
exaction of lower income housing units from commercial developers
do not comply with the requirements of the enabling act. Rather, the
City must adopt an approach which addresses the problem through a
comprehensive plan for long range land use which incorporates the
City's expected future housing needs. To the extent housing needs are
created or exacerbated by commercial development, such develop-
ment should be curtailed until those needs are met by the combined
efforts of the City and of private developers seeking to engage in more
profitable commercial ventures.
Carl J. Rossi
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